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1 Introduction
In this study, we develop a theoretical model of strategic equilibrium bidding and price-setting be-
haviour by heterogeneous and boundedly rational electricity producers and a grid operator in a single
electricity market under uncertain information about production capabilities and electricity demand.
We compare eight different market design variants and several levels of centralized electricity pro-
duction that influence the spatial distribution of producers in the grid, their unit production and cur-
tailment costs, and the mean and standard deviation of their production capabilities.
Our market design variants differ in three aspects. Producers are either paid their individual bid
price (“pay as bid”) or the (higher) market price set by the grid operator (“uniform pricing”). They are
either paid for their bid quantity (“pay requested”) or for their actual supply (“pay supplied”) which
may differ due to production uncertainty. Finally, excess production is either required to be curtailed
or may be supplied to the grid.
After formally deriving producers’ and grid operator’s optimization problems and finding their an-
alytical intractability, we then use numerical simulations to study their resulting strategic behaviour
in an agent-based model slightly similar to Mureddu et al. (2015) with 200 producers on 100 grid
nodes for 50 repetitions of each of the eight markets and ten different synthetically generated network
topologies.
We analyse results w.r.t. several aggregate indicators such as the average bid price-to-cost ratio,
market price, bid quantity-to-mean production ratio, balancing needs, total economic costs, producers’
profits, consumers’ costs, and total grid workload.
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Figure 1: Sample grid generated according to Schultz et al. (2014).
Overall, we find the combination of uniform pricing, paying for requested amounts, and required
curtailment to perform best or second best in many respects, and to provide the best compromise
between the goals of low economic costs, low consumer costs, positive profits, low balancing, low
workload, and honest bidding behaviour.
2 Model
Our model simulates the bidding and price-setting decisions of a number of heterogeneous electricity
producers and their power grid operator under eight different generalized market designs and different
degrees of (de-)centralized production. We focus on the market for a specific time-slot T , e.g., a certain
15-minute interval of the day, and assume that decisions have to be taken at an earlier time t < T , so
that certain quantities such as demand and actual production at time T are uncertain at time t and
have to be described via random variables.
Power grid. We use an ensemble of ten different single-level power grids consisting of n= 100 nodes
each placed at positions chosen uniformly at random from a square territory and connected via the
synthetic random power-grid generation algorithm developed earlier in Schultz et al. (2014). To sim-
plify power flow computations, we assume the grid to be tree-shaped and consist of lossless lines. See
Fig. 1 for an example grid.
Electricity demand. At each node va, there will be an electricity demand at time T whose uncertain
value is described at time t by a random variable da. We assume da to be independently normally
distributed with mean µda and standard deviation σ
d
a = µ
d
a/4, where µ
d
a is larger for more decentral
nodes, representing the fact that demand is rather decentralized. We measure a node v’s centrality by
the standard metric of closeness centrality from complex network theory, which is given by CC(v) =
1/
∑
v′ d(v, v
′), where v′ runs over all nodes and d(v, v′) is the number of transmission lines one has to
pass to get from v to v′. We enumerate all nodes by ascending closeness centrality, so that CC(v1) ¶
CC(v2)¶ . . .¶ CC(vn), and put µda = (n+1−a)/n(n+1). Total demand D thus has mean µD =
∑
a µ
d
a =
1/2 and standard deviation σD =
q∑
a(σda )2 ≈ 1/
p
3n≈ .057, i.e., with a relative variability of about
11%.
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Production capabilities. Electricity is produced by N = 200 independent and heterogeneous pro-
ducers which range from large-scale utilities to smallest-scale producers such as single households with
a number of PV panels. The spatial distribution of producers onto grid nodes is governed by a cen-
tralization parameter −1 ¶ Z ¶ 1, where Z = 1 generates a rather centralized production structure
dominated by traditional large-scale utilities, while Z = −1 generates a rather decentralized produc-
tion structure dominated by variable renewable energy sources (VRES). Depending on Z , producers
are placed onto nodes at random, either favouring more central nodes (for positive Z) or more decen-
tral nodes (for negative Z). More precisely, each producer i = 1 . . .N is then placed at a random node
v(i), where v(i) = va with probability (1+ Z(2a− n− 1)/n)/n.
Each producer i will either produce or not produce electricity at time T . If they produce at time
T , they will produce an amount of electricity that is only known with some uncertainty at time t, so
production is described by a random variable ui . To simplify calculations, we assume ui to be uniformly
distributed between two known limits µi(1−%i) and µi(1+%i). To represent the fact that decentral-
ized production tends to by smaller-scale and more variable, we assume that mean production µi is
positively correlated with the centrality of i and %i is negatively correlated with centrality, by putting
µi = aµ0/n and %i = (n+ 1− a)%0/n, where a is the node index of v(i) = va. We chose µ0 so that
the mean total production potential
∑
i µi = 1, i.e., equals twice the mean demand µ
D = 1/2 to get a
considerable but fixed amount of competition between producers. We put %0 = 1/2 so that the most
decentral nodes will have an uncertain production ranging from µi/2 to 3µi/2, while the most central
nodes have an almost certain production.
Note that for simplicity, we ignore the actually existing but nontrivial spatial correlation in both
demand and production in this study.
Production, balancing, and curtailment costs. Producer i’s unit production costs ci are assumed
to be known for certain and also depend on centrality, ci = a/n, where a is again the node index of
v(i) = va, representing the fact that renewable energy sources have lower production costs. Hence
expected mean unit production costs are c¯ ≈ (3+ Z)/6 ∈ [1/3, 2/3], which will serve us as a reference
point for the emerging market price later and represents a potential production cost reduction of 50%
when going from rather centralized production to rather decentralized production.
If at time T , actual power supply falls short of demand, the grid operator needs to buy upward
balancing energy. Since we do not want to study interactions between different markets such as spot
and balancing market here but focus on the design of one market stage only, we assume here that
the unit upward balancing costs c+ are fixed and known already at time t, and we put c+ = 2, i.e.,
between three and six times the mean unit production costs c¯, depending on the degree of centralization
Z . Analogously, if supply exceeds demand, the grid operator has to buy some downward balancing
demand at a fixed price c−. We choose a relatively large value of c− = 1/4 to represent the assumption
that in view of the need to reduce energy demand, society must give the grid operator a considerable
incentive to avoid excess supply.
In some of our market designs, if producer i produces more than agreed with the grid operator, i
is not allowed to supply this excess production to the grid but is required to “curtail” it. If this is the
case, we assume i’s unit curtailment costs are c0i = c
0
0(n+ 1− j)/n, representing the fact that smaller,
more decentralized producers tend to have larger curtailment costs. On average, however, we assume
that curtailment is rather cheap, being only one percent of mean production costs, c00 = c0/100.
Penalties. In all of our market designs, we assume that producers actually supplying more or less
electricity to the grid than agreed with the grid operator have to pay some penalties to the latter.
These penalties serve a double purpose, they provide an incentive for the producers to make realistic
quantity bids and they compensate the grid operator for balancing costs caused by supply excesses or
shortfalls. Because of the latter, we assume that for each unit of electricity supplied more than agreed
one has to pay a unit excess supply penalty c> that equals downward balancing cost, c> = c−, while for
each unit supplied less than agreed one has to pay a unit supply shortfall penalty c< that equals upward
balancing cost, c< = c+. Note that penalties have to be paid regardless of whether at time T there
is actually any need for balancing. One may consider alternative market designs in which penalties
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reflect actual instead of potential balancing costs, but it turns out that finding optimal bids in such a
scenario is much more complicated than in our setting, so we leave this possibility for future research.
Overall market procedure. At time t, each producer i places a price-and-quantity bid (pi ,qi), thereby
stating that they offer to supply qi ¾ 0 units of power at time T for a unit price of pi ¾ 0. They are free
to choose any combination of pi ,qi , hence bid price pi is not required to be related in any way to unit
production costs ci and bid quantity qi is not required to be related in any way to mean production µi .
However, as we assume producers to be boundedly rational and will chose a combination of pi ,qi that
seems economically optimal for them, i.e., for which they expect their profit to be maximal, in view of
their past observation of the emerging market price and the information available at time t about the
uncertain demand and production capabilities. We will see below that in general, pi > ci , and typically
µi(1−%i)< qi < µi .
After all bids are made, the grid operator selects a set A of producers whose bids they accept, trying
to minimize their expected total costs in view of the uncertain information available at time t. To reduce
the complexity of this optimization problem, we assume that the grid operator does not consider all of
the 2N many possible sets A of producers but only those sets A that result from choosing a cutoff price
P ¾ 0 and accepting all cheaper bids, i.e., putting A= {i : pi ¶ P}. This is motivated by the fact that
if production capabilities and demand were certain, the cheapest way to meet demand D would be to
place the bids into a “merit order” so that p1 ¶ p2 ¶ . . .¶ pn and then choose P so that
∑
i:pi¶P qi ≈ D.
In princinple, when D and ui are uncertain, such a scheme for choosing Amight not actually be optimal
since in view of the high potential costs of balancing mismatches, it may sometimes be preferable to
accept a more expensive but more certain bid (e.g. by a traditional power plant) rather than a cheaper
but more uncertain bid (e.g. by a small PV installation). For two reasons, we ignore this fact here
and still assume that the grid operator accepts all bids below a certain cutoff price. For one, the more
general optimization problem would require much more information about production uncertainties
and would be much harder to solve in reality, so that using the simpler scheme can be interpreted
as some form of bounded rationality. Second, using the more general scheme would probably result
in a bias towards traditional electricity producers which we do not want to assume here as it would
contradict the observable political tendency to rather favour renewable production, so we choose a
scheme that is more unbiased between the two forms.
After the cutoff price P was set at time t, all producers with pi ¶ P will produce some actual
amount of electricity ui at time T , leading to production costs ciui , may have to curtail the excess
production ei = max(ui − qi , 0) (in some marked designs), leading to curtailment costs c0i ei They then
supply some amount si to the grid, where either si = min(ui ,qi) = ui − ei or si = ui , depending on
whether curtailment was required or not. Since supply may still deviate from the requested amount of
electricity that is given by the accepted bid quantity, ri = qi , this may lead to either a positive amount
of excess supply s+i = max(si − ri , 0) or to a positive amount of supply shortfall s−i = max(ri − si , 0),
and thus to total penalties c+s+i + c
−s−i they pay to the grid operator. The grid operator, on the other
hand, pays each producer with pi ¶ P either for the requested amount ri (“pay requested”) or for the
actually supplied amount si (“pay supplied”), and either at a uniform price P (“uniform pricing”) or at
each producer only at their bid price pi ¶ P (“pay as bid”), depending on the market design variant.
Market design variants. The option of either requiring curtailment (“curtail”) or not (“don’t cur-
tail”), paying for either requested or supplied amounts, and paying either a uniform price or as bid, we
thus get 23 = 8 different market design variants to compare, each of which sets different incentives for
producers and grid operator and will thus imply different optimizing behaviour regarding the choice
of (pi ,qi) and P, leading to different strategic equilibria and finally to different total economic costs of
the system, total producers’ profits, total curtailment and balancing, total workload on the grid, etc.
Experiment design. We assume the market is run repeatedly under similar conditions, e.g., each day
of similar weather conditions and for the same time of day T , so that producers can form expectations
about the market price P that they can incorporate into their optimization by treating P as a random
variable whose distribution matches the past distribution of observed values of P. Since this leads to
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−1¶ Z ¶ 1 degree of centralization
da uncertain demand at grid node va
D =
∑
a Da uncertain total demand
ui ¾ 0 uncertain production of producer i
ci > 0 known unit costs of production
c+ > 0 known price of upward balancing by grid operator
c− > 0 known price of downward balancing by grid operator
c< known penalty for supplying one unit less than requested
c> known penalty for supplying one unit more than requested
c0i > 0 known costs of curtailment
pi ,qi ¾ 0 producer’s strategic bid price and quantity
P ¾ 0 grid operators strategically chosen cutoff price
ri ∈ {0,qi} resulting quantity requested from i
si ,S =
∑
i si ¾ 0 actual producer’s and total supply
s<i = max(ri − si , 0)¾ 0 producer’s supply shortfall
s>i = max(si − ri , 0)¾ 0 producer’s excess supply
S< =
∑
i s
<
i ¾ 0 total supply shortfalls
S> =
∑
i s
>
i ¾ 0 total excess supplies
B+ = max(D− S, 0)¾ 0 actual upward balancing needs
B− = max(S − D, 0)¾ 0 actual downward balancing needs
Table 1: Overview of symbols
a relatively fast convergence of bidding behaviour over time, we run each market variant 50 times
in sequence for each of the ten power grids from the ensemble, resulting in a sample of 500 obser-
vations per market variant, so that statistical averages over this sample will have a standard error of
only
p
1/500 ≈ 4.5% of their respective standard deviation, which we will use in testing statistically
whether market variants differ significantly with respect to the above-mentioned indicators.
2.1 Producers’ and grid operator’s behaviour
The central ingredient of the model is our assumption of how producers and grid operator make their
choice of (pi ,qi) and P.
Producers. Let us consider the optimization problem of a fixed producer i, and thus drop the index i
from all quantities for now. In all market variants, i’s profit pi is either zero (if P < p) or of the general
form
pi= βq+ γpq+δPq+ "u+ ζpu+ηPu (1)
(if P ¾ p and u¶ q) or
pi= β ′q+ γ′pq+δ′Pq+ "′u+ ζ′pu+η′Pu (2)
(if P ¾ p and u > q), with coefficients β ,β ′, . . . ,η,η′ that depend on the market design variant, see
Table 2.
The random variables P (assumed to be distributed as observed in the past) and u are independent,
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uniform pricing pay as bid
pay supplied pay requested pay supplied pay requested
don’t curtail curtail don’t curtail curtail don’t curtail curtail don’t curtail curtail
β ′ c> c> c> c>
γ 1 1
γ′ 1 1 1
δ 1 1
δ′ 1 1 1
"′ −c − c> −c − c0 −c − c> −c − c0 −c − c> −c − c0 −c − c> −c − c0
ζ 1 1
ζ′ 1
η 1 1
η′ 1
θ ′ −c> −c> −c> −c>
Table 2: Nonzero optimization coefficients by market design variant. Always β = −c<, " = c< − c, and
θ = c<.
hence expected profit given some choice of (pi ,qi) is
Epi=
∫ ∞
p
dPφP(P)
∫ q
0
duφu(u)[βq+ γpq+δPq+ "u+ ζpu+ηPu]
+
∫ ∞
q
duφu(u)[β
′q+ γ′pq+δ′Pq+ "′u+ ζ′pu+η′Pu]

(3)
=
∫ ∞
p
dPφP(P)

Φ<u (q)[βq+ γpq+δPq] + E
<
u (q)[" + ζp+ηP]
+Φ>u (q)[β
′q+ γ′pq+δ′Pq] + E>u (q)["′ + ζ′p+η′P]

(4)
= Φ>P (p)

Φ<u (q)[βq+ γpq] + E
<
u (q)[" + ζp] +Φ
>
u (q)[β
′q+ γ′pq] + E>u (q)["′ + ζ′p]

+ E>P (p)

Φ<u (q)δq+ E
<
u (q)η+Φ
>
u (q)δ
′q+ E>u (q)η′

, (5)
where φx(·),Φ<x (·) and Φ>x (·) = 1 − Φ<x (·) are the probability density, cumulative and decumulative
distribution functions of random variable x , and we introduced the abbreviations
E<x (y) =
∫ y
0
dx φx(x)x , (6)
E>x (y) =
∫ ∞
y
dx φx(x)x . (7)
For a maximum of Epi with p,q > 0, these first-order conditions must be met:
0 = ∂pEpi= −φP(p)

Φ<u (q)[α+ βq+ (γ+δ)pq] + E
<
u (q)[" + (ζ+η)p] (8)
+Φ>u (q)[α
′ + β ′q+ (γ′ +δ′)pq] + E>u (q)["′ + (ζ′ +η′)p]]

(9)
+Φ>P (p)

Φ<u (q)γq+ E
<
u (q)ζ+Φ
>
u (q)γ
′q+ E>u (q)ζ′

, (10)
0 = ∂qEpi= Φ
>
P (p) [φu(q)[∆α+∆βq+∆γpq] +φu(q)q[∆" +∆ζp] (11)
+Φ<u (q)[β + γp] +Φ
>
u (q)[β
′ + γ′p]

(12)
+ E>P (p)

φu(q)[∆δq+∆η] +Φ
<
u (q)δ+Φ
>
u (q)δ
′ , (13)
where ∂p =
∂
∂ p , ∆α = α − α′ etc. Although this has no closed form solution, it allows us to find i’s
optimal values pi ,qi given the distributions φui , φP numerically, and it turns out that there generally
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Epii depends concavely on pi and qi , hence the unique local maximum is the global maximum. In
general, there is an incentive to bid a low price to increase the chances of being selected, but depending
on the market variant, there is a counteracting incentive to bid a higher price to make sure that the
paid price is high enough to offset production costs and penalties. Also, it may be optimal to bid a
quantity lower than average production, to avoid costly curtailment or excess suppy penalty, or to bid
above average production to avoid penalty for shortfalls and/or get excess payments for oversupply. If
quantity bids are rather low, the merit order will be steeper, so the resulting P will be larger to meet
expected demand, which will explain part of the observed price differences.
Grid operator. In view of all bids (pi ,qi) and the uncertain demand D and production capabilities
ui , the grid operator’s expected profit given some choice of P is
EΠ=
∑
i:pi¶P

Φ<u (q)(βiqi + γipiqi) + E
<
u (q)(θi + ζipi) + P(Φ
<
u (q)δiqi + E
<
u (q)ηi)
+Φ>u (q)(β
′
i qi + γ
′
ipiqi) + E
>
u (q)(θ
′
i + ζ
′
ipi) + P(Φ
>
u (q)δ
′
iqi + E
>
u (q)η
′
i)

− c+EB+ − c−EB−, (14)
where the expected balancing amounts EB+, EB− are determined as follows. Supply si of producer i
with pi ¶ P has expected value Esi = µi in the “don’t curtail” market design variants, and
Esi =

qi if qi ¶ qli
µi if qi ¾ qhi
(q2i −(qli )2)/2+(qhi −qi)qi
qhi −qli otherwise
(15)
in the “curtail” market variants, where qli = µi(1−%i) and qui = µi(1+%i). The corresponding variances
are Var(si) = (qhi − qli )2/12 for “don’t curtail”, and
Var(si) =

0 if qi ¶ qli
(qhi − qli )2/12 if qi ¾ qhi
(qi−qli )3/12
qhi −qli otherwise
(16)
in the “curtail” case. As we assume production at different places to be independent and since N is large,
total supply S is thus approximately normally distributed and its mean and variance can be computed
as ES =
∑
i:pi¶P Esi and Var(S) =
∑
i:pi¶P Var(si). Since production capabilities are independent
of demand, excess demand D − S is thus also approximately normally distributed and its mean and
variance can be computed as m= E(D− S) = µD − ES and v = Var(D− S) = (σD)2 + Var(S). Finally,
EB± is the expected value of B+ = max(D− S, 0) and B− = max(S − D, 0), given by
EB± = exp(−m2/2v)Æv/2pi±m[1+ erf(±m/p2v)]/2, (17)
where erf is the error function.
3 Results
Our results are summarized in Table 3, individual trajectories are shown in Figs. 2–4 for Z ∈ 1, 0,−1.
Overall, we find that in all but one marked design variant, bidding and price-setting behaviour
converges to a strategic equilibrium already after a very small number of repetitions. The only excep-
tion is the “pay as bid, pay supplied, curtail” (henceforth BSC) variant, where for Z ¶ 0 in some runs,
price bids start to increase linearly after a varying number of repetitions (almost immediately in Fig. 3,
somewhat later in Fig. 4), causing the market price and hence the producer’s profits to increase as well,
without affecting the total economic costs however (i.e., only causing an evergrowing transfer from
consumers to producers).
Comparison of electricity market designs for stable decentralized power grids 7
ce
nt
ra
li-
un
if
or
m
pr
ic
in
g
pa
y
as
bi
d
za
ti
on
pa
y
su
pp
lie
d
pa
y
re
qu
es
te
d
pa
y
su
pp
lie
d
pa
y
re
qu
es
te
d
Z
do
n’
t
cu
rt
ai
l
cu
rt
ai
l
do
n’
t
cu
rt
ai
l
cu
rt
ai
l
do
n’
t
cu
rt
ai
l
cu
rt
ai
l
do
n’
t
cu
rt
ai
l
cu
rt
ai
l
1
pr
ic
e
P
0.
84
06
4
1.
25
80
5
1.
19
57
8
1.
20
31
8
1.
42
06
0
2.
01
05
7
1.
61
22
0
1.
61
78
4
to
ta
le
co
no
m
ic
co
st
s
0.
61
72
0
0.
44
27
1
0.
44
37
9
0.
39
15
6
0.
58
41
0
0.
44
41
7
0.
42
89
0
0.
40
24
5
st
d.
to
ta
le
co
no
m
ic
co
st
s
0.
03
54
6
0.
04
00
0
0.
03
39
1
0.
03
24
7
0.
03
58
9
0.
06
42
0
0.
03
41
9
0.
01
82
0
pr
od
uc
er
s’
pr
ofi
ts
pi
-0
.0
00
83
0.
14
27
8
0.
15
46
0
0.
19
17
9
0.
16
81
1
0.
58
63
1
0.
33
89
0
0.
42
65
2
st
d.
pr
od
uc
er
s’
pr
ofi
ts
0.
01
16
6
0.
02
38
1
0.
01
40
0
0.
01
98
5
0.
01
61
7
0.
03
58
7
0.
01
45
0
0.
01
90
0
gr
id
w
or
kl
oa
d
1.
04
97
9
1.
04
12
6
1.
09
56
2
1.
06
11
0
1.
17
79
9
1.
27
18
8
1.
14
88
3
1.
16
82
3
st
d.
gr
id
w
or
kl
oa
d
0.
15
18
5
0.
15
53
1
0.
09
03
6
0.
10
22
2
0.
16
50
0
0.
20
74
6
0.
13
52
0
0.
13
99
0
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
0.
00
00
0
0.
02
25
7
0.
00
00
0
0.
02
17
6
0.
00
00
0
0.
03
09
6
0.
00
00
0
0.
02
34
0
up
w
ar
d
ba
la
nc
in
g
B
+
0.
23
80
8
0.
07
22
2
0.
08
01
3
0.
03
09
3
0.
18
25
0
0.
00
04
0
0.
05
39
9
0.
00
25
1
do
w
nw
ar
d
ba
la
nc
in
g
B
−
0.
00
00
0
0.
00
01
1
0.
00
00
0
0.
00
04
5
0.
00
00
0
0.
05
57
4
0.
00
00
1
0.
02
36
5
(q
i
−µ
i)
/%
iµ
i
-0
.3
00
39
-0
.1
41
83
-0
.0
05
25
-0
.0
24
10
-0
.2
93
92
-0
.0
87
36
0.
07
14
8
0.
06
53
5
bi
d
pr
ic
e-
to
-c
os
t
ra
ti
o
p i
/
c i
1.
89
55
4
2.
35
71
4
2.
43
71
1
2.
07
48
2
3.
07
77
4
3.
90
80
3
3.
31
57
6
3.
22
72
0
0.
5
pr
ic
e
0.
74
17
0
1.
19
55
1
1.
13
59
6
1.
13
35
4
1.
37
61
8
2.
06
40
9
1.
57
35
2
1.
57
95
7
to
ta
le
co
no
m
ic
co
st
s
0.
63
97
6
0.
42
08
9
0.
42
09
2
0.
37
83
6
0.
57
89
7
0.
46
41
4
0.
43
30
0
0.
37
39
4
st
d.
to
ta
le
co
no
m
ic
co
st
s
0.
03
34
1
0.
03
95
6
0.
03
64
3
0.
03
41
6
0.
03
90
8
0.
14
28
6
0.
03
87
3
0.
01
80
0
pr
od
uc
er
s’
pr
ofi
ts
-0
.0
20
28
0.
11
98
6
0.
13
96
0
0.
16
93
6
0.
15
69
8
0.
64
99
6
0.
31
95
6
0.
41
05
8
st
d.
pr
od
uc
er
s’
pr
ofi
ts
0.
01
01
7
0.
02
09
2
0.
01
54
8
0.
01
77
7
0.
01
67
2
0.
18
81
5
0.
01
60
7
0.
01
63
5
gr
id
w
or
kl
oa
d
0.
93
60
4
0.
96
80
8
1.
02
36
9
0.
96
54
2
1.
13
22
0
1.
25
79
6
1.
08
55
5
1.
05
78
0
st
d.
gr
id
w
or
kl
oa
d
0.
15
37
9
0.
11
89
5
0.
17
07
9
0.
12
82
8
0.
17
19
6
0.
35
75
0
0.
14
15
5
0.
14
31
0
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
0.
00
00
0
0.
02
46
9
0.
00
00
0
0.
02
65
7
0.
00
00
0
0.
04
01
0
0.
00
00
0
0.
02
59
1
up
w
ar
d
ba
la
nc
in
g
0.
26
83
6
0.
07
17
5
0.
08
07
0
0.
03
87
3
0.
19
13
3
0.
00
03
8
0.
06
96
0
0.
00
38
6
do
w
nw
ar
d
ba
la
nc
in
g
0.
00
00
0
0.
00
02
6
0.
00
00
0
0.
00
00
6
0.
00
00
0
0.
09
05
2
0.
00
00
8
0.
01
53
7
(q
i
−µ
i)
/%
iµ
i
-0
.2
60
47
-0
.1
28
42
-0
.0
05
00
-0
.0
26
39
-0
.2
55
59
-0
.0
71
31
0.
06
96
7
0.
06
12
3
bi
d
pr
ic
e-
to
-c
os
t
ra
ti
o
p i
/
c i
2.
21
95
7
3.
25
87
2
4.
02
30
3
2.
92
17
2
4.
72
68
6
6.
39
77
0
5.
46
41
7
5.
11
11
8
0
pr
ic
e
0.
61
96
3
1.
09
59
8
1.
04
49
2
1.
05
08
1
1.
30
61
4
2.
26
68
0
1.
52
83
4
1.
54
02
8
to
ta
le
co
no
m
ic
co
st
s
0.
67
88
9
0.
40
73
4
0.
42
73
2
0.
36
80
5
0.
57
94
2
0.
58
33
8
0.
42
27
3
0.
34
45
7
st
d.
to
ta
le
co
no
m
ic
co
st
s
0.
03
69
2
0.
03
70
7
0.
03
66
1
0.
03
28
4
0.
04
46
9
0.
19
14
4
0.
04
01
8
0.
02
21
3
pr
od
uc
er
s’
pr
ofi
ts
-0
.0
36
67
0.
08
52
0
0.
11
06
5
0.
14
22
6
0.
14
17
4
0.
89
43
4
0.
30
62
5
0.
40
69
1
st
d.
pr
od
uc
er
s’
pr
ofi
ts
0.
01
33
8
0.
01
98
4
0.
01
64
1
0.
01
61
4
0.
01
95
3
0.
31
19
7
0.
01
75
4
0.
01
83
6
gr
id
w
or
kl
oa
d
0.
96
60
3
0.
89
84
7
0.
93
21
9
0.
89
50
5
1.
04
12
3
1.
42
19
3
1.
06
79
5
1.
01
56
9
st
d.
gr
id
w
or
kl
oa
d
0.
13
98
5
0.
12
50
8
0.
12
45
8
0.
11
82
6
0.
15
02
1
0.
33
49
1
0.
13
61
0
0.
12
94
4
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
0.
00
00
0
0.
02
99
1
0.
00
00
0
0.
02
82
3
0.
00
00
0
0.
06
54
7
0.
00
00
0
0.
03
20
1
up
w
ar
d
ba
la
nc
in
g
0.
30
59
1
0.
08
26
8
0.
10
57
2
0.
05
60
5
0.
20
78
1
0.
00
00
9
0.
08
16
9
0.
00
86
4
do
w
nw
ar
d
ba
la
nc
in
g
0.
00
00
0
0.
00
00
4
0.
00
00
0
0.
00
00
0
0.
00
00
0
0.
23
06
5
0.
00
00
0
0.
00
88
9
(q
i
−µ
i)
/%
iµ
i
-0
.2
25
89
-0
.1
06
12
0.
00
84
2
-0
.0
15
01
-0
.2
24
83
-0
.0
42
97
0.
08
51
9
0.
07
80
3
bi
d
pr
ic
e-
to
-c
os
t
ra
ti
o
p i
/
c i
2.
73
16
3
4.
49
09
1
6.
52
60
8
4.
11
39
6
6.
99
13
5
10
.2
06
56
8.
69
64
5
7.
87
34
9
Comparison of electricity market designs for stable decentralized power grids 8
ce
nt
ra
lit
y
do
n’
t
cu
rt
ai
l
cu
rt
ai
l
do
n’
t
cu
rt
ai
l
cu
rt
ai
l
do
n’
t
cu
rt
ai
l
cu
rt
ai
l
do
n’
t
cu
rt
ai
l
cu
rt
ai
l
-0
.5
pr
ic
e
0.
49
36
3
0.
96
84
9
0.
91
06
3
0.
92
64
6
1.
23
83
8
2.
36
50
2
1.
45
54
9
1.
48
01
1
to
ta
le
co
no
m
ic
co
st
s
0.
68
71
1
0.
39
23
3
0.
40
38
2
0.
35
67
7
0.
55
51
9
0.
58
77
9
0.
38
72
1
0.
30
77
0
st
d.
to
ta
le
co
no
m
ic
co
st
s
0.
03
89
4
0.
04
06
1
0.
04
01
4
0.
03
49
5
0.
04
75
9
0.
16
09
7
0.
04
46
6
0.
02
42
1
pr
od
uc
er
s’
pr
ofi
ts
-0
.0
49
55
0.
04
78
3
0.
07
39
1
0.
10
30
5
0.
14
02
6
1.
00
32
8
0.
29
23
9
0.
40
00
0
st
d.
pr
od
uc
er
s’
pr
ofi
ts
0.
01
02
3
0.
02
83
9
0.
01
80
6
0.
01
90
0
0.
02
24
3
0.
29
00
1
0.
01
79
4
0.
02
31
9
gr
id
w
or
kl
oa
d
0.
98
52
7
0.
80
87
9
0.
81
49
0
0.
78
05
7
0.
96
52
0
1.
28
33
2
0.
91
83
5
0.
83
15
4
st
d.
gr
id
w
or
kl
oa
d
0.
12
69
9
0.
10
53
1
0.
09
21
7
0.
09
41
0
0.
13
56
3
0.
26
97
3
0.
14
05
6
0.
11
43
7
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
0.
00
00
0
0.
03
62
2
0.
00
00
0
0.
03
59
3
0.
00
00
0
0.
09
42
6
0.
00
00
0
0.
04
27
6
up
w
ar
d
ba
la
nc
in
g
0.
32
01
3
0.
09
99
3
0.
11
87
2
0.
07
83
0
0.
20
96
6
0.
00
03
2
0.
08
40
1
0.
01
48
9
do
w
nw
ar
d
ba
la
nc
in
g
0.
00
00
0
0.
00
00
1
0.
00
00
0
0.
00
00
0
0.
00
00
0
0.
28
07
7
0.
00
00
2
0.
00
58
3
(q
i
−µ
i)
/%
iµ
i
-0
.2
08
56
-0
.0
97
22
0.
00
50
6
-0
.0
19
85
-0
.2
07
94
-0
.0
29
52
0.
08
03
0
0.
07
36
8
bi
d
pr
ic
e-
to
-c
os
t
ra
ti
o
p i
/
c i
3.
18
48
9
5.
13
78
5
8.
61
43
5
4.
70
34
8
8.
79
29
5
13
.4
96
40
11
.4
16
92
10
.0
05
18
-1
pr
ic
e
0.
44
07
7
0.
79
91
7
0.
77
08
9
0.
75
87
4
1.
13
50
5
2.
05
62
5
1.
31
32
6
1.
32
84
0
to
ta
le
co
no
m
ic
co
st
s
0.
63
30
3
0.
35
33
7
0.
35
57
4
0.
32
65
1
0.
49
88
1
0.
46
14
9
0.
36
59
5
0.
28
61
9
st
d.
to
ta
le
co
no
m
ic
co
st
s
0.
15
66
9
0.
06
12
6
0.
07
28
8
0.
05
16
2
0.
09
08
5
0.
14
50
1
0.
05
25
4
0.
03
01
9
pr
od
uc
er
s’
pr
ofi
ts
-0
.0
48
54
0.
00
92
5
0.
04
08
9
0.
05
11
8
0.
14
38
6
0.
78
85
9
0.
25
06
7
0.
33
84
5
st
d.
pr
od
uc
er
s’
pr
ofi
ts
0.
04
71
5
0.
04
34
8
0.
01
91
2
0.
02
76
5
0.
06
27
2
0.
27
69
8
0.
03
04
0
0.
02
22
3
gr
id
w
or
kl
oa
d
0.
95
49
3
0.
80
36
1
0.
86
13
6
0.
78
86
9
0.
95
68
1
1.
12
60
2
0.
90
80
1
0.
80
52
1
st
d.
gr
id
w
or
kl
oa
d
0.
16
58
1
0.
10
70
6
0.
09
84
3
0.
11
22
6
0.
15
51
7
0.
22
13
0
0.
16
14
2
0.
14
14
5
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
0.
00
00
0
0.
04
75
1
0.
00
00
0
0.
04
48
7
0.
00
00
0
0.
11
15
7
0.
00
00
0
0.
04
79
2
up
w
ar
d
ba
la
nc
in
g
0.
29
17
8
0.
09
38
7
0.
10
58
2
0.
08
02
4
0.
18
45
5
0.
00
11
5
0.
09
19
0
0.
02
95
7
do
w
nw
ar
d
ba
la
nc
in
g
0.
00
08
1
0.
00
03
0
0.
00
05
5
0.
00
05
3
0.
00
04
4
0.
21
05
6
0.
00
05
2
0.
00
07
4
(q
i
−µ
i)
/%
iµ
i
-0
.2
32
69
-0
.1
12
70
0.
00
91
2
-0
.0
37
03
-0
.2
39
92
-0
.0
25
26
0.
10
50
8
0.
08
20
4
bi
d
pr
ic
e-
to
-c
os
t
ra
ti
o
p i
/
c i
3.
51
43
6
4.
74
75
1
8.
34
41
7
4.
61
74
5
9.
67
13
6
14
.6
20
34
12
.1
63
32
10
.8
74
70
al
l
pr
ic
e
0.
62
49
5
1.
06
82
2
1.
01
73
4
1.
02
06
3
1.
29
95
8
2.
17
38
2
1.
50
43
5
1.
52
11
8
to
ta
le
co
no
m
ic
co
st
s
0.
66
02
7
0.
41
09
5
0.
41
66
9
0.
36
96
3
0.
56
79
3
0.
52
62
4
0.
41
01
9
0.
34
28
7
st
d.
to
ta
le
co
no
m
ic
co
st
s
0.
06
92
6
0.
05
27
7
0.
04
87
9
0.
04
15
9
0.
05
73
9
0.
16
73
3
0.
04
88
7
0.
04
52
4
pr
od
uc
er
s’
pr
ofi
ts
-0
.0
33
09
0.
07
90
0
0.
10
41
2
0.
13
22
4
0.
14
63
1
0.
81
03
5
0.
30
22
5
0.
40
21
1
st
d.
pr
od
uc
er
s’
pr
ofi
ts
0.
02
64
6
0.
05
27
5
0.
04
12
8
0.
04
90
6
0.
03
01
6
0.
29
61
8
0.
03
11
2
0.
03
22
6
gr
id
w
or
kl
oa
d
0.
96
24
9
0.
90
00
7
0.
95
59
1
0.
90
25
4
1.
05
35
3
1.
30
93
4
1.
03
09
8
0.
98
03
7
st
d.
gr
id
w
or
kl
oa
d
0.
15
38
2
0.
15
63
1
0.
15
67
3
0.
15
55
1
0.
17
85
1
0.
33
42
8
0.
17
11
5
0.
18
75
5
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
0.
00
00
0
0.
03
04
1
0.
00
00
0
0.
03
06
1
0.
00
00
0
0.
06
81
9
0.
00
00
0
0.
03
48
3
up
w
ar
d
ba
la
nc
in
g
0.
29
11
4
0.
09
00
3
0.
10
21
6
0.
06
06
2
0.
20
14
8
0.
00
07
3
0.
07
77
3
0.
01
07
9
do
w
nw
ar
d
ba
la
nc
in
g
0.
00
00
9
0.
00
01
1
0.
00
00
6
0.
00
01
5
0.
00
00
5
0.
18
83
5
0.
00
00
8
0.
01
07
6
(q
i
−µ
i)
/%
iµ
i
-0
.2
34
53
-0
.1
08
50
0.
00
37
7
-0
.0
20
55
-0
.2
32
73
-0
.0
46
45
0.
07
84
8
0.
07
03
3
bi
d
pr
ic
e-
to
-c
os
t
ra
ti
o
p i
/
c i
2.
73
04
5
4.
14
35
8
6.
20
15
2
3.
79
58
3
6.
78
79
8
9.
93
89
1
8.
39
83
3
7.
60
09
7
Ta
bl
e
3:
A
gg
re
ga
te
si
m
ul
at
io
n
re
su
lt
s
by
de
gr
ee
of
ce
nt
ra
liz
at
io
n
an
d
m
ar
ke
t
de
si
gn
va
ria
nt
.
A
ve
ra
ge
s
an
d
so
m
e
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
ns
,
ea
ch
ba
se
d
on
a
sa
m
pl
e
of
si
ze
50
0
(1
0
ne
tw
or
ks
w
it
h
50
ti
m
e
st
ep
s)
.
B
ol
df
ac
e
an
d
re
d
bo
ld
fa
ce
m
ar
k
be
st
an
d
ex
tr
em
e
va
lu
es
in
a
ro
w
,
bo
ld
fa
ce
it
al
ic
s
2n
d
be
st
va
lu
es
or
va
lu
es
co
ns
id
er
ed
to
be
a
go
od
co
m
pr
om
is
e,
bl
ue
va
lu
es
co
ns
id
er
ed
to
o
la
rg
e.
Comparison of electricity market designs for stable decentralized power grids 9
0 10 20 30 40 50
iteration
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
centr. 1, uniform pricing, pay supplied, don't curtail
0.0090
0.0095
0.0100
0.0105
0.0110
0.0115
avg.p/c
price P
P0
request R
demand D
supply S
econ.costs
prod.profits
curtailment
S<
S>
B+
B-
avg.(q/mu-1)/delta total flow
0 10 20 30 40 50
iteration
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
centr. 1, uniform pricing, pay supplied, curtail
0.0095
0.0100
0.0105
0.0110
0.0115
0.0120
0.0125
0.0130
avg.p/c
price P
P0
request R
demand D
supply S
econ.costs
prod.profits
curtailment
S<
S>
B+
B-
avg.(q/mu-1)/delta total flow
0 10 20 30 40 50
iteration
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
centr. 1, uniform pricing, pay requested, don't curtail
0.0105
0.0110
0.0115
0.0120
0.0125
avg.p/c
price P
P0
request R
demand D
supply S
econ.costs
prod.profits
curtailment
S<
S>
B+
B-
avg.(q/mu-1)/delta total flow
0 10 20 30 40 50
iteration
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
centr. 1, uniform pricing, pay requested, curtail
0.0105
0.0110
0.0115
0.0120
0.0125
0.0130
0.0135
avg.p/c
price P
P0
request R
demand D
supply S
econ.costs
prod.profits
curtailment
S<
S>
B+
B-
avg.(q/mu-1)/delta total flow
0 10 20 30 40 50
iteration
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
centr. 1, pay as bid, pay supplied, don't curtail
0.010
0.011
0.012
0.013
0.014
0.015
avg.p/c
price P
P0
request R
demand D
supply S
econ.costs
prod.profits
curtailment
S<
S>
B+
B-
avg.(q/mu-1)/delta total flow
0 10 20 30 40 50
iteration
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
centr. 1, pay as bid, pay supplied, curtail
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
0.020
avg.p/c
price P
P0
request R
demand D
supply S
econ.costs
prod.profits
curtailment
S<
S>
B+
B-
avg.(q/mu-1)/delta total flow
0 10 20 30 40 50
iteration
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
centr. 1, pay as bid, pay requested, don't curtail
0.009
0.010
0.011
0.012
0.013
0.014
0.015
avg.p/c
price P
P0
request R
demand D
supply S
econ.costs
prod.profits
curtailment
S<
S>
B+
B-
avg.(q/mu-1)/delta total flow
0 10 20 30 40 50
iteration
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
centr. 1, pay as bid, pay requested, curtail
0.010
0.011
0.012
0.013
0.014
avg.p/c
price P
P0
request R
demand D
supply S
econ.costs
prod.profits
curtailment
S<
S>
B+
B-
avg.(q/mu-1)/delta total flow
Figure 2: Sample trajectories for all eight market design variants for the centralized casee Z = 1. In all
cases, bidding and price-setting behaviour converges almost immediately to a strategic equilibrium.
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Figure 3: Sample trajectories for all eight market design variants for no centralization or decentralization
(Z = 0). Now, in the “pay as bid, pay supplied, curtail” variant, an additional run with non-converging but
increasing price and profits is shown. In all other cases, bidding and price-setting behaviour converges
almost immediately to a strategic equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Sample trajectories for all eight market design variants for the decentralized case Z = −1.
Again, in the “pay as bid, pay supplied, curtail” variant, an additional run with non-converging but
increasing price and profits is shown.
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Bid price. In general, bid prices are at least around twice as high as production costs, being lowest
under the “uniform pricing, pay supplied, don’t curtail” design in the centralized case Z = 1 (p/c =
1.89 on average), highest under the BSC design in the decentralized case Z = −1 (p/c = 14.62 on
average), which may be partially because of the increasing bid effect mentioned above, but almost as
high under the “pay as bid, pay requested, don’t curtail” designs in the decentralized case (p/c = 12.16
on average). Bid prices are always lower under uniform pricing than under pay as bid, since by bidding
a lower price under uniforma pricing, a producer will not risk getting a lower payment price (which
equals P) but will only increase their chance of being selected, hence the only incentive to not make
a too low bid is to make sure that when selected, P is large enough to cover production costs and
expected penalties.
Bid quantity. For most designs, average bid quantities are below mean production capabilities: pro-
ducers bid conservative quantities since shortfall penalties are higher than excess supply penalties.
Only under “pay as bid, pay requested” for all values of Z and under “uniform pricing, pay requestes,
don’t curtail” for Z ¶ 0, bid quantities are usually higher than mean production capabilities. This is
because in the “pay requested” designs, shortfall penalties are effectively lowered by the fact that the
grid operator still pays for the (higher) bid quantity rather the (lower) actual supply. The other two
design choices (uniform pricing or pay as bid, and curtailment yes or no) were not found to have such
a clear effect on bid quantities.
Market price and requested amount. Because of the lower bid prices, also market price is always
lower under uniform pricing than under pay as bid, typically by a factor of around 1.5 to 2. The
extremes are P = 2.37 on average under BSC with Z = −0.5, and P = 0.44 on average under “uniform
pricing, pay supplied, don’t curtail” with Z = −1, which is even below the average production costs, and
consequently producers’ profits are negative in this case, making this a non-feasible design. The lowest
price that makes production profitable is generally realized under “uniform pricing, pay supplied, don’t
curtail” for most values of Z , resulting in P ≈ 1, i.e., 1.5 to 3 times the mean production costs, with
profits still only being ≈ 0.15 for Z = 1 and ≈ 0.04 for Z = −1 due to excess/shortfall penalties that
grow with decreasing centralization.
The relationship between requested amount R =
∑
i:pi¶P qi and actual demand D differs widely
between variants. For all values of Z , they match closest under “uniform pricing, pay requested, curtail”
and almost as well under “uniform pricing, pay supplied, curtail”. For Z = −1, they also match well
under “uniform pricing, pay requested, don’t curtail”. Under-requesting D−R is largest under the “pay
supplied, don’t curtail” variants and still significant under the “pay requested, don’t curtail” variants.
This is in part because if producers need not curtail excess production, the grid operator expects excess
supply, knowing that bid (and thus requested) quantities are considerably (under “pay supplied”) or
at least moderately (under “pay requested”) below mean production. In contrast, in the “pay as bid,
curtail” variants, R is usually slightly larger than D.
Balancing needs. Interestingly, under the “don’t curtail” variants, the grid operator’s expectation of
excess supply (i.e., positive S−R) turns out to be incorrect and consequently there is need for consider-
able upward balancing. Except for the BSC design, upward balancing needs are generally significantly
larger than downward balancing. Under pay as bid, balancing needs are generally somewhat lower
than under uniform pricing.
Total economic costs. Total economic costs, i.e., the sum of all production, curtailment, and balanc-
ing costs, but without penalties (which are only flows within the economy), vary largely over the eight
market design variants, being largest under “uniform pricing, pay supplied, don’t curtail” (0.66 on av-
erage) due to the large upward balancing needs, and smallest (only half as high) under “pay as bid,
pay requested, curtail” (0.34 on average). This difference becomes larger for smaller centralization Z .
The second-best design w.r.t. total costs is “uniform pricing, pay requested, curtail” (0.37 on average).
In general, the choice between uniform pricing and pay as bid does not exhibit a consistent influence
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on total costs. With the exception of “uniform pricing, pay supplied, don’t curtail”, costs decrease with
decreasing centralization Z , reflecting the lower production costs of VRES.
Producers’ profits, consumers’ costs. For an economic evaluation, producers’ profits are the second
most interesting indicator besides total economic costs. They also vary largely over the eight market
design variants, being negative on average under “uniform pricing, pay supplied, don’t curtail”, making
this an economically infeasible design, are slightly positive (0.079 on average) under “uniform pricing,
pay supplied, curtail”, and are largest (0.81) under BSC. Notably, under the overall cheapest design,
“pay as bid, pay requested, curtail”, profits are large (0.4), while under the second-cheapest design,
“uniform pricing, pay requested, curtail” (URC), they are only a third as high (0.13).
Note that in our model, the grid operator’s total costs equal total economic costs plus producers’
profits, and these can be interpreted as the consumers’ total electricity costs. Consequently, for “pay
as bid, pay requested, curtail” these are about 0.34 + 0.4 = 0.74 on average, while for URC they
are only about 0.37 + 0.13 = 0.5. When going from centralized to decentralized, this ratio increases
from about 3/4 to almost 1/2. Consumers’ costs are even slightly smaller under “uniform pricing, pay
supplied, curtail” (0.41+0.08 = 0.49, with a strongly statistically significant two-sample t-test), which
is however considerably more expensive overall. Hence consumers would prefer the latter design,
producers would prefer BSC, a social planner not interested in welfare effects would prefer “pay as
bid, pay requested, curtail”, and a social planner caring for welfare effects would probably prefer the
compromise design URC.
Grid workload. As an overall indicator of the stress placed onto the grid, the potential needs for
extending it, and the overall likelihood of line trippings, we look at the total power flow summed
over all grid lines, here called the “grid workload”, computed by standard power flow calculations on
the underlying grid topology. Overall, workload is smallest under the two “uniform pricing, curtail”
variants, with no statistically significant difference between the two, and is highest and most volatile
under BSC. Except for the latter design, workload coefficient of variation is generally around 1/6,
interestingly not varying much between the centralized and decentralized situations, but suggesting
that lines need a considerable amound of excess capacity to avoid tripping.
4 Conclusion
In view of the above results, this study suggests that the best compromise between the eight possible
designs studied here might be given by the URC market design in which producers are paid a uniform
market price instead of their bid price, are paid this price for the requested (i.e., the bid) quantity of
electricity, regardless of whether their actual supply falls short of their bid quantity, but have to pay
a fixed penalty for each unit of electricity not supplied and are not allowed to supply more than bid
but have to curtail any excess production. As seen above, this combination seems to lead to an almost
optimal overall level of total economic costs of electricity production, an almost optimal optimal level of
consumers’ costs, a robust but moderate profitability for electricity producers, a low level of balancing
needs, a moderate market price for electricity, “honest” bid quantities close to expected production
capability, and the smallest level of grid workload (i.e., higher reliability of supply).
All other studied designs seem to perform considerably worse than URC in one or several aspects.
The “pay as bid” variants have higher price bids, hence higher market prices and higher total consumers’
costs, less honest quantity bids, higher workload, and (except for “pay requested, curtail”) higher total
economic costs. The “pay supplied” and “don’t curtail” variants have higher balancing needs, hence
higher total economic costs, and (except for “uniform pricing, pay supplied, curtail”) higher workload.
In view of the rather conceptual nature of this study, we recommend focussing in future research
on (i) simulating several coupled markets (e.g., day-ahead, intraday, balancing), (ii) using real-world
demand profiles and cost distributions for production, curtailment, and balancing, (iii) distibnguish-
ing different types of producers (traditional plants and utilities, small VRES producers, virtual power
plants, etc.) more explicitly than here, where we used a kind of continuum of producer types, (iv)
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compare simulated bidding and price-setting behaviour over time with real-world data to assess the
amount of bounded rationality in real-world agents and improve the model.
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